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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE PURLOINED PENTAGON PAPERS AND PRIOR
RESTRAINT: THE PRESS PREVAILED!
The event was unprecedented. The greatest leak of classified information in the history of the United States' enabled The New York
Times to disclose to the world the decision making process whereby the
Johnson Administration had escalated the conflict in Vietnam. Sharing
the front page of the Sunday edition (June 13, 1971) of The Times with
the report of the wedding of Tricia Nixon to Edward Cox, 2 was the first
installment in a series about the history of American involvement in
Vietnam.3 A bland headline-VIETNAM ARCHIVE: PENTAGON
STUDY TRACES 3 DECADES OF GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT- introduced six pages of ponderous text, including columns
of secret documents. The Times, consistent with its view of the responsibility of the press, 4 published this information despite its classified
nature.
On Monday, June 14, the second installment appeared., The
Nixon Administration, seeking to withdraw from Vietnam in orderly
and honorable fashion, moved to dam the flow of classified material.

Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, discussed with Harding F. Bancroft, executive vice president of The Times, the possibility
of voluntary cessation of the series. 6 Attorney General John N. Mitchell
telegraphed The Times to "respectfully request" that it refrain from
further publication, on the ground that such disclosures cause "irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States," and return all
relevant material to the Government. 7 The intention of the Justice
1 Ti~m, June 28, 1971, at 11.
2 N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
8 Id.,

col. 4.
4A fundamental responsibility of the press in this democracy is to publish
information that helps the people of the United States to understand the processes of their own Government, especially when those processes have been clouded
over in a veil of public dissimulation and even deception....
It is the effort to expose and elucidate that truth that is the very essence
of freedom of the press.
Id., June 16, 1971, at 44, col. 1.
Additionally, The Times stated that it would not have published the articles
if there had been any reason to believe that publication would have endangered
the life of a single American soldier or in any way threatened the security of our
country or the peace of the world.
Id.
5 Id., June 14, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
Id., June 15, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
l Id., Nmvswmm, June 28, 1971, at 15.
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Department - to obtain court enjoinder if necessary - was made perfectly clear, and the possible penalties for revealing classified information injurious to the national security were cited.8 The Times, constrained by principle to "respectfully decline," then threw down the
gauntlet by publishing installment number three. 9
The impact of publication was tremendous, domestically and internationally. Shock waves reverberated through the White House, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, and the Congress. The Senate
contemplated an investigation of the origins of United States involvement in Vietnam, and the House of Representatives planned to study
the classification system. Military sources expressed fear that the documents already published might compromise this nation's secret codes.
Communist governments gleefully exploited the situation, and friendly
governments expressed deep concern about the ability of the United
States to maintain confidences. 10 At home, distrust of government and
disgust with the Vietnam conflict increased. 1
These extraordinary ramifications of publication elicited an un8 TIME, June 28, 1971, at 17.
The allegedly applicable provision of the Espionage Act states:
...
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance or note relating to

the national defense, or information relating to the national defense, which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates,
delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered or transmitted, or
attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered
or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States
entitled to receive it . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1964).
9 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
10 The diplomatic reaction was angry. Diplomats from at least five nationsCanada, Germany, France, Thailand and South Vietnam- all inquired officially
or unofficially about the leak and the chances that it might happen again. "If
diplomatic communications cannot be held in confidence," said one important
European leader, "then we have a very serious problem." Canada was particularly
upset at having one of its diplomats identified as having run America's escalation
messages to Hanoi. Other documents contained some unvarnished thoughts about
friendly nations; one disclosed that Britain, Australia, and New Zealand were filled
in fully on the original bombing plans, Canada somewhat less -and South Korea,
Taiwan and the Philippines less still. "It is," said one U.S. official, "a disaster for
the integrity of government."
Nawsw.aa,

June 28, 1971, at 14.

President Nixon reportedly was primarily concerned with the possibility that additional security breaches might occur. "His concern goes to the government being able to
conduct foreign policy in a confidential way." Id. at 15.
Secretary of State William P. Rogers deemed publication a "very serious matter"
that would cause a "great deal of difficulty" for the Government in its foreign relations.
U.S. NEWS & WoRLD Rm
P., June 28, 1971, at 21.

Former Ambassador Averell R. Harriman concurred: "If governments can't have
private papers kept in confidence, I don't know how you can do business in government."
TIME, June 28, 1971, at 19.
11 NEwswE.K, June 28, 1971, at 12.

1971]

PENTAGON PAPERS

precedented response by the Nixon Administration. For the first time
in American history, the federal government brought an action to
suppress publication of articles by a newspaper. To that end, "that
ancient antithesis of a free press, the long discredited practice of 'prior
restraint,'"12 was invoked. Amazingly, a momentous issue had been
joined, with Government raising the standard of national security and
The Times unfurling the banner of freedom of the press. Resolution
of this dramatic confrontation by the Supreme Court of the United
States seemed inevitable, and promised clarification of the comparative
weights of the Government's right to maintain secrecy and the press's
conflicting right to report to the public about governmental operations.
This epic constitutional encounter began before Judge Murray I.
Gurfein, of the Southern District Court of New York. The Government
initially moved for a temporary restraining order and for return of the
contested material, on the ground that publication would irreparably
injure the United States, particularly in its foreign relations.1 3 Professor
Alexander Bickel, of Yale Law School, argued on behalf of The Times
that the action was a "classic case of censorship" forbidden under the
first amendment. 14 Judge Gurfein granted the temporary restraining
order, stopping The Times' disclosures, and ordered a hearing on the
Government's motion for a preliminary injunction on Friday, June 18.
Importantly, no return of The Times' material was ordered. 15
The Government renewed its motion for return of the classifieds
material on June 16. The Times argued that its documents might
enable the Government to discover the newspaper's source, and noted
that the Government had copies of the study.'7 Judge Gurfein signed
an order instructing The Times to show cause on the following day
why it should not be required to produce its material.' 8
The next day, however, the Government failed to obtain inspec12 TmE, June 28, 1971, at 17; see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20
LAW 8- CoNTEMP.PROB.

648 (1955).

13 N.Y. Times, June 16, 1971, at 1, col. 8. The memorandum by the Government is

printed id. at 18, cols. 6-8.
14 Id. at 18, col. 2. The Times viewed the Government's action as "an unprecedented

example of censorship." Id. at 44, col. 1.
15 Id. at 1, col. 8.
16The material in question was dassified under Executive Order 10501, entitled
"Safeguarding Classified Information."
17 The Times' copies included handwritten notations, which would facilitate identification of the source. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1971, at 14, col. 1. For a thorough discussion
of the status of newsmen's sources, see Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure
of Confidential Sources and Information, 24 VAND. L. REv. 667 (1971); Guest & Stanzler,
The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Xxv.
18 (1969); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 CoLun. L. Xxv. 838,
859 et seq. (1971); Note, Judicial Relief for the Newsmen's Plight: A Time for Secrecy,
45 ST. JoHN's L.Rxv. 484 (1971).
18 N.Y. Times, June 17, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
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tion of the documents in The Times' possession. Judge Gurfein barred
any such "fishing expedition," but persuaded The Times to provide the
Government with a list of the materials that it possessed. 19 This early
solicitude of The Times indicated the extreme difficulty of the task
before the Government, i.e., proving that the danger from continued
publication required limitation of the first amendment.
On Friday, June 18, the hearing on the motion for a preliminary
injunction was held before Judge Gurfein. United States Attorney
Whitney North Seymour presented the issue as
whether, when an unauthorized person comes into possession of
documents which have been classified under lawful procedures,
that person may unilaterally declassify those documents in his sole
20
discretion.
He argued that further publication would adversely affect "current
military and defense plans and intelligence operations and . . . our

international relations." 2 1 Judge Gurfein, however, described the issue
as
whether, assuming that in the guise of security ...

a government

wishes to suppress matters that might be embarrassing to it domestically, the Government has the right to do that under the
First Amendment. 22
It was apparent that Judge Gurfein had not been convinced at the close
of the hearing.
Meanwhile, the Government's problems were multiplying. The
Washington Post had somehow acquired portions of the top secret
report and published this day an article derived from them. Efforts to
convince The Post to cease such disclosures were unavailing, so the
Government requested a temporary restraining order from District
Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell. Incredibly, Judge Gesell refused to
grant this motion, on the ground that the first amendment prohibits
23
prior restraint "on publication of essentially historical data.
19 Id., June 18, 1971, at 1, col. 5. The Government maintained that the Freedom
of Information Act precluded The Times from obtaining rightful possession. It therefore argued: "The Times cannot claim any greater right to these documents and materials
because they are presently in the unlawful and unauthorized possession of The Times."
Ad. at 14, col. 3.
201d., June 19, 1971, at 10, col. 4.
21 Id. Seymour insisted that the court was "not dealing with matters of closed history
but matters which have very current vitality and significance." He expressed deep concern
that additional disclosures "would currently adversely affect the military alliances, diplomatic efforts relating to a number of sensitive matters, including military matters, and
present and future military and defense plans and strategy." Id., col. 5.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1, col. 4. Judge Gesell's decision is printed id. at 10, coL 7.
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Stunned Government attorneys immediately appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A three-judge court was
convened to consider the appeal. At 1:20 A.M., June 19, some five
hours after Judge Gesell issued his opinion, a temporary restraining
order was granted, two to one. Judges Spottswood Robinson III and
Roger Robb voted to reverse the district court; Judge J. Skelly Wright
dissented. 24 The Post was halted from further publication of excerpts

from the Pentagon study pending a full hearing before the district
court on the Government's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Judges Robinson and Robb concluded that "an injunction against
publication of material vitally affecting the national security" 25 is
permissible under the Constitution and deemed the governmental
interest in securing the temporary restraining order more significant
than any infringement upon the freedom of the press.26 Judge Wright
vehemently disagreed This is a sad day for America. Today, for the first time in two
hundred years of our history, the Executive Department has succeeded in stopping the presses. It has enlisted the judiciary in the
suppression of four most precious freedoms. As if the long and
sordid war in Southeast Asia had not already done enough harm
to our people; it now is used to 2cut
the heart of our free institu7
tions and system of government.
but the Government had again succeeded in temporarily clamping the
lid on its personal Pandora's box.
Any celebration of this achievement was brief, however. Later in
the day, Judge Gurfein denied the Government's motion for a preliminary injunction, on the ground that
no cogent reasons were advanced as to why these documents, except in the general framework 28of embarrassment, would vitally
affect the security of the nation.
The court agreed that the Government had an inherent right to bring
the action, 29 but accepted the argument of Professor Bickel, The Times'
attorney, that the Government had failed to establish a "direct and
immediate link" between "the fact of publication" and some "grave
24 Id. The

preliminary opinion is printed id. at 10, col. 7.

25 Id., June 20, 1971, at 27, coL 3.
26 Id., col. 4.
27 Id.
28 TiME, June 28, 1971, at 18.
29 N.Y. Times, June 20, 1971,

at 26, col. 2, citing Wyandotte Co. v. United States,
889 US. 191, 201-02 (1967); United States v. Arlington County, 526 F.2d 929, 932-33
(4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Brittain, 819 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
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event" jeopardizing the United States.8 0 The matter in question not
being "absolutely vital to current national security," 31 and freedom
of the press being essential to the American system of government,82
injunctive relief was denied.3 3
34
The Government quickly appealed Judge Gurfein's decision
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. judge Irving Kaufman
blocked The Times' resumption of publication by issuing a temporary
restraining order, on the ground that otherwise the appeal would be
rendered moot.35 Arrangements were made for a three-judge court to
hear the appeal,3 6 as the case moved relentlessly toward the Supreme
Court.
On June 21, Judge Gesell again disappointed the Government.
He denied its motion for a preliminary injunction against The Post,
on the ground that the Government had not shown "an immediate
grave threat to the national security, which in close and narrowly
3 7
defined circumstances would justify prior restraint on publication. 1
Judge Gesell found that further disclosures might adversely affect current and contemplated negotiations,38 but was not convinced
that there will be a definite break in diplomatic relations, that
there will be an armed attack on an ally, that there will be a compromise of military or defense plans, a compromise of intelligence
operations, or a compromise of scientific and technological materials.m
In these circumstances, the court concluded,
there is no basis upon which the court may adjust [the first
amendment] to accommodate the desires of foreign governments
dealing with our diplomats, nor does the First Amendment guarantee our diplomats that they can be protected against either re40
sponsible or irresponsible reporting.
30 TME, June 28, 1971, at 17.

31 N.Y. Times, June 20, 1971, at 26, col. 4.
82"The

security of the Nation is not at the ramparts alone. Security also lies in

the value of our free institutions." Id. col. 5.

33 Significantly, the court asserted that the Government's action was "no attempt ...
at political suppression." Id.
34 The Times,

understandably, described the decision as "a landmark in the endless

struggle of free men and free institutions against the unwarranted exercise of govern-

mental authority." Id., June 21, 1971, at 28, col. 2.
35 Id., June 20, 1971, at 1, col. 8. Judge Kaufman's order is printed id. at 26, col. 6.
For the judge's views on the first amendment, see Kaufman, The Medium, The Message
and The First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 761 (1970).
36 Id., June 21, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
87 Id., June 22, 1971, at I, col. 7. The opinion is printed id. at 18.

88 d. at 18, col. 3.
39 Id., col. 5.

40 Id., col. 7. This sentiment calls to mind the eloquent words of John Marshall,
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The Government appealed immediately, and secured extension
of the restraining order from a three-judge court. It was announced
that all nine judges of the District of Columbia Circuit would hear
the appeal on the following day, June 22.41
On June 21, a three-judge court extended the temporary restraining order against The Times and announced that because of its
"extraordinary importance" all eight judges of the Second Circuit
would hear the appeal.42 United States Attorney Seymour, unsuccessful
in his efforts to persuade Judge Gurfein that the circumstances were
sufficiently exceptional to justify prior restraint, bolstered his argument
on the facts with the legal argument that
[n]ational defense documents properly classified by the Executive,
are an exception to an absolute freedom of the press, and should
be protected by the courts against unauthorized disdosure.43
Thomas Jefferson was invoked in support of this position:
... All nations have found it necessary that, for the advantageous conduct of their affairs, some of these proceedings, at
least, should remain known to their Executive functionary only.
He of course, from the nature of the case, must be the sole judge
of which of them the public interests will permit publication.44

The burden of proving the district court judge clearly wrong on the
facts prompted the Government to broaden its attack and to redefine
the issues.
member of the famous XYZ mission, in 1798. Talleyrand, then French Minister of Exterior
Relations, had strongly protested the "invectives and calumnies" in United States newspapers "against the Republick and against her principles, her magistrates, and her envoys."
2 AaimucAN STATE PAmPms (Foreign Relations) 188, 191 (1798-1803). The later Chief Justice
drafted this brilliant reply:
The genius of the constitution, and the opinions of the people of the United
States, cannot be overruled by those who administer the Government. Among
those principles deemed sacred in America; among those sacred rights considered
as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the Government contemplates with
awful reverence, and would approach only with the most cautious circumspection,
there is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed in the public
mind than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often carried to excess,
that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness is seen and lamented; but
the remedy has not yet been discovered. . . . No regulations exist which enable
the Government to suppress what calumnies or invectives any individual may
choose to offer to the public eye. .. . Without doubt this abuse of a valuable
privilege is a matter of peculiar regret when it is extended to the Government
of a foreign nation ....
It is a calamity incident to the nature of liberty. ...
Id. 196, quoted in Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MicH. L. Rxv.

703, 715-16 (1938).
41

N.Y. Times, June 22, 1971, at 1, col. 7.

42 Id., col. 8.
43 Id. at 18, col. 1.

44 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Federal Attorney George W. Hay of the District
of Virginia, June 17, 1807, quoted id., cols. 2, 3.
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The next day, June 22, with the Second Circuit sitting en banc,
Seymour maintained vigorously that further disclosures were so dangerous to the nation as to warrant prior restraint. He argued that such
publication would adversely affect efforts to end the conflict in Southeast Asia, negotiations to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East,
American interests in Central Europe, and vital discussions between the
United States and the Soviet Union concerning strategic arms limitations. 45 The Times, Seymour charged, was in violation of the Espionage
Law, 46 and must be enjoined.
While Seymour inveighed against additional compromises of security to the Second Circuit in New York, Solicitor General Erwin N.
Griswold advanced the same and other arguments before the District
of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc in Washiigton, D.C. Asserting
that freedom of the press is not absolute, the Solicitor General noted
that injunction is available to protect a copyright and spoke of the
literary property doctrine.4 7 Extraordinary circumstances, he argued,
permitted and necessitated injunctive relief, for the first amendment
was "not intended to make it impossible for Government to function." 4
The rare appearance of the Solicitor General below the Supreme
Court level indicated the extreme importance of the case to the Government.
While the courts of appeals heard appeals by the Government,
a third newspaper

-

The Boston Globe -

published an article based

upon the top secret report. The Justice Department unsuccessfully
sought voluntary cooperation and then secured a temporary restraining order from Judge Anthony Julian.49 Judge Robb, of the District of Columbia Circuit, wondered whether the Government was
asking the judiciary to "ride herd on a swarm of bees with a pencil."50
Perhaps he was prescient, for newspapers from Miami to Los Angeles
published articles derived from the controversial report soon thereafter.51
On June 23, the federal appeals courts rendered their decisions.
In The Times case the Second Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for additional in camera proceedings and determination
whether particular items "pose[d] such grave and immediate danger
45

N.Y. Times, June 23, 1971, at 22, col. 2.

Id., col. 8; see note 8 supra.
47 Id. at 23, col. 8.
48 TImE, June 28, 1971, at 13.

46

49

N.Y. Times, June 23, 1971, at 23, col. 1. The order is printed id., col. 2.

50 NEWSWEEK,
51 Id.

July 5, 1971, at 17.
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to the security of the United States as to warrant their publication
being enjoined. . ."52 The court, 5 to 3,thus accepted the Government's argument that prior restraint is not unconstitutional per se, and
gave the Government another opportunity to establish the special circumstances necessary to support an injunction. The temporary restraining order issued by the court would remain in effect until June
25, when it would lapse except in regard to those items specified by the
Government for consideration by the district court. 53
The Government fared very poorly, however, in its action against
The Post. Despite the efforts of Solicitor General Griswold, the District of Columbia Circuit, 7 to 2, ruled in favor of The Post, but
continued the restraining order to allow an appeal by the Government.5 4 The Government had failed to overcome the "heavy presumption against" any prior restraint.5 5 The decision was "fortified" by
"substantial doubt" that the courts could provide "effective relief."56
Judge Wilkey dissented from complete affirmance, on the ground that
certain documents should be remanded to the district court for specific
consideration. 57 Judge MacKinnon strongly dissented, suggesting that
the court "abdicate[d] [its] responsibility to protect the security of our
nation's military and diplomatic activities" and favoring a limited remand.58
The following day, June 24, the Government's motion for a
rehearing was denied, 7 to 2, by the District of Columbia Circuit.5 9
The Post case proceeded toward the Supreme Court, and The Times
applied to that Court for a writ of certiorari.6 0 On June 25, the Court
agreed, 5 to 4, to hear the appeals the next day and placed both
newspapers under the same restraints imposed upon The Times by the
Second Circuit. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall would
have permitted the newspapers to resume publication without hearing
52 United

States v. New York Times Co., 89 US.L.W. 2744 (2d Cir. 1971).

53 id.
54 N.Y. Times, June 24, 1971, at 1,col. 7.
55 United States v. Washington Post Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 2744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), citing

Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 2745.
58 Id. at 2744-45.
I would not reward the theft of these documents by a complete declassification.
There is a regular method by which access to classified information can be accomplished and in my view the prescribed method should be followed in this as
in other instances.

Id. at 2745.
59 N.Y. Times, June 25, 1971, at 1, col. 5. The text is printed id. at 18, col. 2.

0Id., col. 8. The petition is printed id. at 12, col. 8.
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oral argument. 61 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court for the first time
imposed a prior restraint on newspapers. 62
The Court convened in an unusual Saturday session to hear oral
arguments for two hours. The Government's request for in camera
proceedings was rejected, 6 to 3, as the session commenced, but submission of briefs under seal was allowed.63 The Solicitor General
argued that publication would seriously endanger the nation and
stressed the basic right of the Government to function. Invoking the
power of the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief,
he portrayed injunctive relief as essential to maintaining the integrity of
the Presidency. The copyright and literary property doctrines were
mentioned as legitimate exceptions to freedom of the press. Additionally, equitable considerations were raised, with The Times and The
Post being described as knowing participants in a breach of fiduciary
duty. The Solicitor General was struggling mightily to obtain judicial
reconsideration of the ramifications of disclosure of the numerous
documents to which the Government specifically objected. 64
Professor Bickel argued that the Government had failed to prove
its case:
...what characterizes every instance in which the Government
tries to make its case factually is a chain of causation, whose links
are surmise and speculation, all going toward some distant event
65

Under the standard suggested by Bickel, prior restraint is possible only
where publication would proximately cause especially serious danger
to the United States. 66 In the absence of such circumstances, he argued,
application of the severe 6 7 remedy of prior restraint is clearly unconstitutional.
William R. Glendon, attorney for The Post, advanced essentially
the same arguments presented by Professor Bickel. He insisted that
the Government had not established its case and reminded the Court
Id., June 26, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
Id. at 10, col. 3.
Id., June 27, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
Id. at 24. A transcript of oral argument is printed id. at 24-26.
65 Id. at 25, col. 3.
66 Id., col. 4. Chief Justice Burger noted the extreme difficulty faced by the Government under this standard: "Can anyone know in any certain sense the consequences of
disclosure ... ?" Id., col. 6. Additionally, the Chief Justice found ironical the newspapers'
claim of secrecy for their sources of information and denial of the same privilege to the
Government. Id., cols. 5, 6; see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 751
n.1 (1971).
67"If the criminal statute 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it." Id., col. 2.
61
62
63
64
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that The Post had not initiated the equity proceeding.6 The newspapers were pressing their freedom under the first amendment to its
farthest boundaries.
Chief Justice Burger, to the disappointment of those preferring
an immediate decision, announced that the matter was being taken
under advisement. Thus the Court retired to weigh the conflicting
interests and to evaluate the evidence.
HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The landmark decision which would soon be announced, would
depend upon interpretation of the first amendment. Hence, a brief
review of its history is in order. This is especially necessary in light of
the statement by Zechariah Chafee "that the framers had no very clear
idea as to what they mean by 'the freedom of speech or of the press'
" 69

The idea of prior restraint was inspired by the invention of printing in the fifteenth century. The rapid development of this new means
of mass communication prompted religious and civil leaders to seek
control over it. In 1501, Pope Alexander VI established a policy of
prior restraint by banning unlicensed printing. In Great Britain, where
the American doctrine of prior restraint developed, printing was controlled by the Crown.7 0 The licensing system was established in the
colonies, much to the distress of the colonists, and later, taxation on
circulation of and advertising in newspapers was applied to suppress
publication of matter to which the Crown objected. This restriction
on freedom contributed to the dissatisfaction which culminated in
the American Revolution.7 1
On September 14, 1787, at the Constitutional Convention, Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney and Elbridge Gerry moved to incorporate in the
Constitution a declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be
Inviolably observed." Roger Sherman spoke against the motion, on
the ground that the press was not within the scope of congressional
power. It was defeated, 7 to 4.72 When the proposed Constitution was
published, however, there was an insistent demand for the incorporation of a bill of rights which inter alia would guarantee freedom of
speech and of press.73 Indeed, ratification most probably could not
68 "We were brought in kicking and screaming, I guess." Id. at 26, col. 2.
69 Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REV.891, 898 (1949).

70 Emerson, supra note 12, at 650.
71 See Stewart, Lennox and the Taxes on Knowledge, ScoTtSa His1. REV. 526 (1918).
FEDRALCONVENTION OF 1787, 617-18 (1911).
73 E. HUDON, FRUMOss OF SPEECH AND PRSS IN AmmucA 2 (1963).

12 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS Or T-E
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have been achieved without the promise that Congress immediately
would propose amendments including these guarantees and submit
them to the states for ratification.
The First Congress kept this promise. It proposed on September
25, 1789 the amendments constituting the Bill of Rights, which the
states ratified in due course. James Madison had introduced in the
House a version of the first amendment under which
[t]he people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom
of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.7 4
Freedom of the press, Madison believed, should be inviolable by the
federal government and by the states.7 5 Significantly, the first amendment as finally drafted read: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
The phrase, freedom of speech, however, was not defined, although
contemporary interpretations were contradictory. Blackstone had written that
[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this
is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous
or illegal, he must take the consequences
77
of his own temerity.
But the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had offered this construction:
What then is the meaning of the Bill of rights, and the Constitution of Pennsylvania, when they declare, "That the freedom

of the press shall not be restrained," and "that the printing presses
shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any part of the government?" However ingenuity may torture the expressions, there can be little
doubt of the just sense of these sections: they give to every citizen
741 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1834).
75 Id. 435.

see

76 U.S. CONST. amend. I. For further discussion of the intent of the "founding fathers,"
TiE FIRST AND THE FIFTH 12 et seq. (1960).

O.RocGE,

77 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 (1769). Lord Mansfield concurred, in King

v. Dean of St. Asaph, 3 T.R. 428, 431 (1784): "The liberty of the press consists in printing
without any previous license, subject to the consequences of law." But Professor Chafee
described the Blackstonian interpretation as "thoroughly artificial, and wholly out of accord with a common sense view of the relations of state and citizen." Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOm
OF SPEECH 9-10 (1920).
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a right of investigating the conduct of those who are entrusted

with the public business; and they effectually preclude any attempt
to fetter the press by the institution of a licenser. The same
principles were settled in England, so far back as the reign of William the Third, and since that time, we all know, there has been
the freest animadversion upon the conduct of the Ministers of
that nation.78
Later, Justice Story would view the first amendment this way:
[r]he language of this Amendment imports no more than that a
man shall have a right to speak, write or print his opinions upon
any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always,
that he does not injure any other person in his rights, person,
property or reputation; and so always, that he does not thereby
disturb the public peace or attempt to subvert the Government.79
It was clear that freedom of the press was guaranteed under the first
amendment, but uncertain what specific activities were covered by that
umbrella. The task of clarification logically devolved upon the United
States Supreme Court.
In 1897 the Court construed this freedom narrowly. It was found
"perfectly well settled" that the Bill of Rights merely enumerated
pre-existing rights which are "subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case." These exceptions being
implicit, freedom of speech and press under the first amendment did
not allow "publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or
other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation
....

8o Thus, the Court did not read the first amendment as absolute.

A unanimous Court announced the famous "dear and present
danger" test in the landmark case of Schenck v. United Statess ' in 1919.
78 Respublica v. Oswvald, 1 US. (1 Dall.) 319, 325 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1788); accord, Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825) (construing freedom of the press
under the Massachusetts constitution).
79 11 J. STORY, COMmENTAR.s § 1880, at 597-98 (2d ed. 1851).
There is a good deal of loose reasoning on the subject of the liberty of the
press, as if its inviolability were constitutionally such, that, like the king of
England, it could do no wrong, and was free from every, and afforded a perfect

sanctuary for every abuse; that, in short it implied a despotic sovereignty to do
every sort of wrong, without the slightest accountability to private or public jus-

tice. Such a notion is too extravagant to be held by any sound constitutional

lawyer, with regard to the rights and dudes belonging to governments generally.

Id., § 1884, at 600.
s0 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); see Note, Restrictions on the Freedom
of the Press, 16 HARv. L. Rv.55, 56 (1902).
81249 U.S. 47 (1919); see Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger-Its Origin
and Application, 13 U. DET. L.J. 198 (1950); Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present
Danger: Scope of Its Applicability, 48 MscH. L. REv. 811 (1950); Corwin, Freedom of
Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: A Rdsumd, 30 YAE U.J. 48 (1920); Hart,
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Therein, a conviction under section 4 of the Espionage Act was affirmed.
The defendant had conspired to obstruct the United States recruiting
system and, toward that end, distributed circulars to drafted men. The
Court, per Justice Holmes, made this analysis:
[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done .... The most stringent protection of free speech

would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.
.. . The question in every case is whether the words used are

used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight
and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any con82
stitutional right.

Rather than interpret the first amendment as "a semantic straitjacket,"8 3 the Court subordinated the interest of free speech to another
value, i.e., the Government's right to function.8 4
It was not until 1931 that the Court was called upon to interpret
the doctrine of prior restraint under the Constitution, in Near v.
Minnesota.s5 A state statute, commonly known as the Minnesota Gag
Law, enabled that state to seek injunctions against future publications
of "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" matter.88 Issuance of an
injunction under this law was held inconsistent with freedom of the
press8 7 as made applicable regarding state action under the fourteenth
Power of Government Over Speech and Press, 29 YALE L.J. 410 (1920); Quisumbing, The
Clear and Present Danger Rule as a Limitation of Freedom of Speech and of the Press,
22 PHILIPPINE L.J. 136 (1947); see also Goldstein, The Constitutionality of Legislation
Limiting Freedom of Speech and Press, 9 U. CIN. L. REv. 265 (1935); Richardson,
Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HAtv. L. REv. 1 (1951).
82249 U.S. at 51-52.
88 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951): "To those who would paralyze
our Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket
we must reply that all concepts are relative." Accord, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666-68 (1925); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332 (1920); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 US. 402, 419 (1918).
84 Even James Madison had observed that it was "vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation." THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 251 (H. Lodge ed.

1888) (J. Madison).
85 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see Emerson, supra note 12, at 652-55; Note, Previous Restraints
Upon Freedom of Speech, 31 COLUM. L. Ragv. 1148 (1931).
86 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 10123-1 to 10123-3.
87283 U.S. at 722-23.
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amendment.8 8 The Court noted the paucity of previous attempts to
apply prior restraints to criticism of public officials8 9 and, looking to
the "operation and effect" 90 of the statute in question, decided that
the injunction constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Chief Justice Hughes, author of the majority opinion in the 5
to 4 decision, observed that freedom from prior restraint is not absolute, however. He recognized an exception in time of war 91 and then
stated:
No one would question but that a government might prevent
actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication
of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops. 92
Thereafter, the Chief Justice cited obscene matter as another exception to the general prohibition against prior restraint, for reasons
88 Id. at 707; see Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
HAv. L. REV. 431 (1926).
s9 Id. at 718.
90 Id. at 708.
91 Id. at 716, citing Schenck v. United States, 249 US. 47, 52 (1919).
92 Id., citing Z. CrYEE, Fymomo OF SPEECH 10 (1920). Professor Chafee rejected the
idea of an absolute ban on prior restraint, on the ground that thereunder the Government
could not "prevent a newspaper from publishing the sailing dates of transports or the
number of troops in a sector." Id. 9-10.
However, Chafee also believed that
it is a disastrous mistake to limit criticism to those who favor the war. Men
bitterly hostile to it may point out evils in its management like the secret
treaties, which its supporters have been too busy to unearth ....
The history of the last five years shows how the objects of a war may change
completely during its progress, and it is well that those objects should be
steadily reformulated under the influence of open discussion not only by those
who demand a military victory, but by pacifists who take a different view of the
national welfare. Further argument for the existence of this social interest becomes
unnecessary if we recall the national value of the opposition in former wars.
Id. 36-37.
Chafee stated:
Every reasonable attempt should be made to maintain both interests unimpaired,
and the great interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest
in public safety is really imperiled, and not, as most men believe, when it is barely
conceivable that it may be slightly affected. In war time, therefore, speech should
be unrestricted by the censorship or by punishment, unless it is clearly liable to
cause direct and dangerous interference with the conduct of the war.
Id. 38.
Later, Chafee restated his position in light of subsequent scientific developments:
Nevertheless, the search for truth cannot be absolutely immune from legal
interference. . . . Plans of battleships and atomic energy formulas cannot be
passed out to the public; the truer they are, the worse the disclosure. In short,
the attainment of truth is not the only purpose for which the community exists.
Truth may have to be sacrificed to some more important social need, just as the
drafted soldier is required to sacrifice his right to personal liberty and perhaps
to life for the sake of national safety.
NS OF LsrxrY 114 (1956).
Z. CHAFEt, THE BLsSN
For a general discussion of considerations concerning governmental restrictions, see
1 Z. Csmss, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATONS 33-61 (1947).
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similar to those justifying the above exception.93 Additionally, subversion and incitements to violence were beyond the pale of constitutional protection.9 4 None of these exceptions was applicable, however,
so the Chief Justice's analysis is but dictum.
Subsequently, a unanimous Court struck down a state tax upon
certain newspapers under the prior restraint doctrine, in Grosjean v.
American Press Co.95 It was held clear that such taxation, reminiscent
of the colonial period but previously unknown in the United States,
was an infringement upon freedom of the press precluded under the
fourteenth amendment. While declining to hold prior restraint unconstitutional per se, 96 the Court created a "heavy presumption against"
97
its constitutionality.
Against this background, New York Times Co. v. United States
and United States v. The Washington Post Co. were decided.
THE DECISION: VICTORY FOR THE PRESS

The Court extended its term for the first time in fourteen years

98
to complete its prompt deliberations upon these extraordinary cases.
On June 30, in a 6 to 3 decision, the Court denied the Government's
request for an injunction, thus freeing the newspapers to resume
publication.9 9 In an unsigned per curiam opinion, followed by an
unprecedented nine separate opinions, the Court restated the "heavy
presumption against" prior restraint'"0 and concluded that the Government had failed to meet its "heavy burden."' 0'1 The decision of
the District of Columbia Circuit was affirmed, and the Second Circuit
02
was directed to affirm the district court's decision.
93 283 U.S. at 716. The Court does not cite Chafee for this proposition, but it may be

significant that Chafee made the same point immediately following the statement for
which he was cited. Z. CRArEE, FREoM oF SPEECH 10 (1920).
94"The constitutional guarantee of free speech does not 'protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.' Gompers v. Buck
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 [1911]." 283 U.S. at 716.
95297 U.S. 233 (1936).
96 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 46 (1961) (upholding municipal ordinance
requiring prior submission of motion pictures). Motion pictures had been held "within
the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendment." Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). See Verani, Motion Picture Censorship and
the Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 3 HourON L. REV. 11 (1965).
97 See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
98 NEwswEEK, July 12, 1971, at 16.

99 N.Y. Times, July 1, 1971, at 1, col. 8. The Times regarded the decision as "a
ringing victory for freedom under law." Id. at 46, col 1.
100 403 U.S. 713 (1971), quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)
and citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
101 Id. at 714, quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
102 Id.
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JusticeBlack, concurring
Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas joined, reasserted his
view that oral argument was unnecessary for proper disposition of these
cases. He saw "every moment's continuance of the injunctions . . .
[as] a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First
Amendment."1 03 The contention that "specific and emphatic guarantees" incorporated in the Bill of Rights could be qualified by provisions
in the original Constitution was vigorously rejected as a heinous "perversion of history."' 10 4 Justice Black steadfastly maintained that the
press is enabled under the first and fourteenth amendments "to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior
restraint." 05
The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that
the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained
press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people
and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers
and foreign shot and shell.06
Justice Black dismissed as "bold and dangerously far-reaching" the
idea that the judiciary should limit freedom of the press "in the name
of equity, presidential power and national security. . . ," for
[t]he guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense
of informed representative government provides no real security
107
for our Republic.
The Times, The Post, and other newspapers which published articles
based upon the top secret report received the Justice's compliments
for fulfilling the alleged mission allegedly foreseen for them by the
"Founding Fathers."' 0 8
103 Id. at 715; see Black & Calm, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A
Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 549 (1962).

104 Id. at 716; but see Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 494, 521 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring):
Just as there are those who regard as invulnerable every measure for which
the claim of national survival is invoked there are those who find in the Constitution a wholly unfettered right of expression. Such literalness treats the words
of the Constitution as though they were found on a piece of outworn parchment
instead of being words that have called into being a nation with a past to be
preserved for the future. The soil in which the Bill of Rights grew was not a soil

of arid pedantry.
105 1d. at 717.
106 Id.
10ld, at 718-19.

108 Id. at 717.
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Justice Douglas, concurring
Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black joined, restated his
absolutist interpretation of the first amendment and specifically condemned the stays issued in the course of litigation as infringements
upon freedom of the press. 0 9 He found no statute barring publication
of the material in question," 0 and no inherent power in the Government to obtain injunctive relief in the interest of national security."'
The war power being inapplicable, for want of a declaration of war
by Congress," 2 there was no possible basis for invocation of prior restraint to preclude what Justice Douglas acknowledged might be "a
serious impact" of disclosure"n 3
Justice Brennan, concurring
Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion to advise the lower
courts not to grant temporary restraining orders suppressing publication under similar circumstances."

4

[T]he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial
restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that
untoward consequences may result." 5
Justice Brennan recognized "a single, extremely narrow" area in which
freedom from prior restraint is subordinated to the national interest
in time of war and perhaps in circumstances tantamount to war." 6
He concluded, however, that the Government had failed to prove that
publication would result in "a nuclear holocaust" or "an event of that
nature."117 No injunction or restraining order should issue, Justice
Brennan announced, before the Government proves that publication of
contested material will result "inevitably, directly and immediately"
in a grave event, e.g., destruction of a transport." 8 Each restraint im109 Id.

at 724.

110 Upon examination of the legislative history, Justice Douglas concluded that 18

U.S.C. § 793(e) (1964) (see note 8 supra) did not apply to the press. While the word publish
had been used in other provisions in the Espionage Act, it was omitted in the above section. Additionally, a version of that section which would have encompassed publication
had been rejected. Id. at 720-22.
111 Id. at 723, citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
112 Id. at 722, citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 724-25.
115 Id. at 725-26.
116 Id. at 726, citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
117 Id. Additionally, Justice Brennan deemed the Government's copyright argument
inapposite, on the ground that copyright protects form of expression only. Id. at n.0.
118 Id. at 726-27.
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posed upon the press as the cases proceeded toward final resolution
by the Supreme Court was lamented as unconstitutional, 1 9 and the
haste with which the proceedings were conducted was applauded as
120
essential.
Justice Stewart, concurring
Justice Stewart, with whom Justice White joined, initially recognized the "enormous power" of the Executive regarding national defense and international relations. He viewed "an enlightened citizenry"
as "the only effective restraint" upon said power, and "an informed
and free press" as necessary to public awareness. 12 ' At the same time,
however, he recognized as "elementary" the proposition that confidentiality and secrecy are essential to the maintenance of effectual foreign
relations and effective national defense. 12 2 Justice Stewart's resolution
of this conflict was to place the responsibility with the power.
[IThe Executive must have the largely unshared duty to determine
and preserve that degree of internal security necessary to exercise
23
that power successfully.
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart concluded that the Court could not enjoin publication of information in violation of the national interest,
for the Government had not definitely proved that the result would be
"direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
24
people."1
Justice White, concurring
Justice White, with whom Justice Stewart joined, emphasized
that the first amendment does not preclude prior restraint in the
national interest under all circumstances. He believed that disclosure
of certain documents cited by the Government would cause "substantial damage to public interests," but did not believe that the Government had satisfied "the very heavy burden" prerequisite to prior
at
at
1221 Id. at
122 Id. at
129Id.
120 Id.

727.
725.
727-28.
728.

Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual
trust unless they can be assured that their confidences will be kept. And within
our own executive departments, the development of considered and intelligent
international policies would be impossible if those charged with their formulation
could not communicate with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In
the area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of

course, self-evident.

Id.
123

Id. at 729.

124 Id. at 70.
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restraint. 12 5 Without congressional authorization, Justice Stewart was
unwilling to accept the proposed standard of "grave and irreparable
injury to the public interest.' 2 6 He stressed, however, that the burden
of proof necessary to support criminal sanction is less than that required
for prior restraint, 127 and ameliorated his discomfiture with the hopeful
statement that "a responsible press may choose never to publish the
28s
more sensitive materials.'
JusticeMarshall,concurring
Justice Marshall acknowledged the President's broad powers as
29
Commander-in-Chief and in the area of international relations.
While conceiving of possible situations in which the President's inherent and implicit powers would support prior restraint, however, he
declined under the separation of powers doctrine to grant a preliminary
injunction in these circumstances. 180 Justice Marshall noted that at
least twice the Congress declined to enact laws which would have enabled the President to forbid, or forbidden, publication of classified
information without proper authorization. 131 Although recognizing
that 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) may be applicable to publication, 1 32 he would
not usurp the power of Congress to make law.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting
Chief Justice Burger viewed most critically the manner in which
the Court had resolved the conflict of
the imperative of a free and unfettered press .

.

. with another

imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modern government and specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional
powers of the Executive. 3s
He deplored as "unseemly" and "frenetic" the haste with which the
proceedings were conducted, concluding that "needless," "frenetic,"
and "unwarranted" pressure had vitiated them.8 4 Without knowing all
125 Id. at 730-31.
126 Id. at 732.
127 Id. at 733.

128Id.
Id. at 741, citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Corp., 33 U.S.
103 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); United States v. CurtissWright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
130 Id. at 742-43.
131 Id. at 746.
132 Id. at 745.
183 Id. at 748. The Chief Justice recognized the "universal abhorrence of prior restraint." Id.
129

134

Id. at 749.
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the facts, the Chief Justice was unprepared to consider the merits;
he therefore favored affirmance of the remand by the Second Circuit
and continuance of the temporary restraining order against The Post.185
The Times, which had deferred publication for several months, was
assailed for compelling "a parody of the judicial process," and for
fail[ing] to perform one of the basic and simple duties of every
citizen with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or secret government documents ....to report forthwith, to
responsible public officers. 18 6
Possible criminal sanctions for disclosure and retention of matter
18 7
classified in the interest of national defense, were noted.
Justice Harlan, dissenting
Justice Harlan, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined, deemed the speed with which the Court disposed
of the cases as "almost irresponsibly feverish."' 3 8 He listed several important questions which had not received proper consideration due to
the speed with which the litigation was decided. 8 9 Reluctantly reaching
the merits, he favored affirmance of the Second Circuit, on the ground
that the Government did not have adequate opportunity to prove its
case in the district court, and reversal of the District of Columbia
Circuit, for failing to grant proper deference to classification. 140 The
restraints upon the press would be continued, because the doctrine of
prior restraint does not preclude the courts from preserving the status
quo in order to permit proper disposition.' 4 '
Justice Harlan observed, under the separation of powers doctrine,
that judicial review of the actions of the Executive in the area of international relations is extremely narrow in scope.142 He would limit the
185 Id. at 752.
138 Id at 750, 752.
1371Id. at 751.
138 Id. at 753. Justice Harlan recalled the pertinent admonition of Justice Holmes to

courts deciding cases evoking great public interest:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because
of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was dear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 US. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
quoted id. at 752-53.
189 Id. at 753-55.
140 Id. at 755-56.
141 Id. at 758-59.
142 Id. at 758.
mhe very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy ispolitical, not
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scope of judicial review here to determination of whether "the subject
matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the President's foreign relations power.' 1

43

The only additional safeguard would

be the requirement of "actual personal consideration" by the Secretary
of State or the Secretary of Defense in support of the determination
that disclosure will "irreparably impair the national security. ...
Justice Blackmun, dissenting
Justice Blackmun lamented the "frenetic pace" of the proceedings. 145 While willing to allow publication of most of the classified
material, 146 he was deeply concerned that disclosure of some documents
might eventuate in what Judge Wilkey deemed "great harm to the
nation," i.e., "the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the
greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate .. ."147 Justice Blackmun refused
to interpret the first amendment as an absolute and advocated the use
of a balancing test. 1468 He warned of possible criminal sanction 149 and
implored the press to be responsible. 150
CONCLUSION

Let us forego the temptation toward emotional charges of treason
or tyranny, recognize the conflict between freedom of the press and
national security as a profound constitutional problem, and endeavor
to reconcile these fundamental principles. Freedom of the press is
judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political
departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.... They are decisions
of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power
not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948), quoted id.
at 757-58.
President Washington had aptly described the situation in his message to the House
of Representatives, in which he declined to provide information about the negotiation of
the Jay Treaty:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must
often depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure
of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a
pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences,
perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers.
IJ. IZCHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 194-95 (1899), quoted id. at 756-57.
143 Id. at 757.
144 Id.
145 Id.

at 760.
at 760.
146 Id. at 759.
147 Id. at 762.
148 Id. at 761.
149 Id. at 759.
150 Id. at 762-63.
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essential to the American way of life: it reflects both the individual
interest in expression and the social interest in dissemination of information and opinion. General denial of this freedom, enshrined in
the first amendment in 1791, is inconceivable. The attempt to stifle
criticism is a matter of the gravest concern.
Freedom of the press, however, is contingent upon continuation of
the Government. As such, it must be subordinated in the national
interest when the alternative is destruction of the nation. It is clear
that freedom of the press may not be infringed to prevent embarrassment to the Government. Under what circumstances may disclosure
be enjoined when the danger immanent in it is more than mere embarrassment but less than Armageddon?
It seems that the above question can only be answered according
to the facts of each case. Delineation between embarrassment and grave
danger, however, must be made deliberately and dispassionately. Upon
a showing that the matter in question had been classified in the national
interest, a temporary restraining order should issue. The Government
should be given adequate opportunity to prove its case. The doctrine
of prior restraint should not be construed to prevent the courts from
determining whether publication would so jeopardize the national
security as to warrant injunction. Classification in the name of national security should be deferred to as sufficient basis for restraint
upon publication, unless it is unreasonable to conclude that disclosure
endangers the national security. The personal consideration of the
Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense could be required as a
prerequisite to the granting of a preliminary injunction. The rarity
of significant security breaches permits such a procedure.

